Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition

Patrice Bougette (), Oliver Budzinski and Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: Digital platforms, ecosystems, and R&D intensive sectors pose distinctive challenges for merger control. In these fast-evolving markets, shaped by technological change and shifting competitive dynamics, traditional ex-ante reviews often fall short in anticipating long-term outcomes. This paper proposes a multi-step merger control model that includes a mechanism for remedy revision, allowing authorities to adjust behavioral commitments during their implementation. By embedding structured flexibility into merger decisions, our approach enables remedies to evolve in response to market reconfigurations, strategic conduct, or regulatory insights. The framework aims to ensure that remedies remain proportionate, effective, and legally predictable. By bridging ex-ante assessment and ex-post adaptation, it offers a policy instrument better suited to the uncertainties of dynamic competition.

Keywords: Merger control; merger remedies; dynamic competition; competition policy; innovation; digital markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05-27
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-05087373v1
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Working Paper: Revisiting Behavioral Merger Remedies in Turbulent Markets: A Framework for Dynamic Competition (2025)
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