Prévenir les risques de parallélisme de comportements par développeur commun: De la constatation des limites des règles de concurrence au retour du Nouvel Instrument Concurrentiel

Frédéric Marty and Thierry Warin ()
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Thierry Warin: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal, CIRANO - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations [Montréal, Canada] = Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations [Montréal, Canada]

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Abstract: In oligopolistic settings, algorithmically mediated interactions have the potential to yield price equilibria above the competitive benchmark, while remaining outside the reach of traditional antitrust sanctions insofar as they qualify as non-collusive parallel conduct. The predictive accuracy and adaptive capacity of such algorithms can foster market outcomes that enhance firms' profitability but harm consumer welfare. These developments suggest the need for regulatory instruments to supplement the existing competition law framework. In this respect, the Draghi Report's proposal for a New Competition Tool offers a promising avenue. The present analysis examines the nature and scope of voluntary commitments that undertakings might adopt to mitigate the competition concerns raised by such algorithm-driven market dynamics.

Keywords: algorithms; parallel behaviors; tacit collusion; regulation; parallélisme de comportements; collusion tacite; régulation; algorithmes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-08-25
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Working Paper: Prévenir les risques de parallélisme de comportements par développeur commun: de la constatation des limites des règles de concurrence au retour du Nouvel Instrument Concurrentiel (2025)
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