The Proper Scope of Antitrust: Behavioural Remedies Between Competition Law Enforcement and Regulatory Interventions

Patrice Bougette () and Frédéric Marty
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Patrice Bougette: UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur

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Abstract: This article examines the evolving role of behavioural remedies in antitrust enforcement and their increasing convergence with regulatory approaches. Based on a typology of remedy design, it identifies a continuum from rule-based injunctions to adaptive conduct obligations that resemble sectoral regulation. While dynamic markets - particularly in the digital economy - may justify greater flexibility, we argue that unconstrained discretion or permanent oversight risks transforming antitrust into de facto regulation. The paper proposes a framework for implementing bounded flexibility through predefined revision mechanisms, ensuring remedies remain both effective and consistent with competition principles. By delineating the frontier between competition law and regulation, this analysis contributes to ongoing debates on the proper institutional scope of antitrust enforcement

Keywords: competition law; regulation; dynamic markets; digital economy.; behavioural remedies; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-23
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Working Paper: The Proper Scope of Antitrust: Behavioural Remedies Between Competition Law Enforcement and Regulatory Interventions (2025)
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