Networks Performance and Contractual Design: Empirical Evidence from Franchising

Magali Chaudey () and Muriel Fadairo ()
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Muriel Fadairo: CREUSET - Centre de Recherche Economique de l'Université de Saint-Etienne - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne

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Abstract: This article deals with the links between networks performance and the design of vertical contracts. It provides evidence broadly consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, constraining contracts for the retailers favor a better performance at the network level

Keywords: vertical relationships; contractual constraints; contracts econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05-22
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://ujm.hal.science/ujm-00070949
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