Nudging Behaviors in a Dynamic Common Pool Renewable Resource Experiment

Murielle Djiguemde, Dègnon David Dadakpete, Dimitri Dubois () and Mabel Tidball ()
Additional contact information
Murielle Djiguemde: LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon [Dijon] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Dègnon David Dadakpete: LEDi - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dijon [Dijon] - UB - Université de Bourgogne - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]
Dimitri Dubois: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier

CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro

Abstract: The efficient management of common pool resources has long been a subject of economic inquiry, with seminal works by Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968) underscoring the importance of regulatory measures. In recent times, there has been a shift towards incorporating behavioral insights into policy design, with 'nudges'-subtle policy tools aimed at influencing decision-making-gaining increasing attention. This paper explores the effectiveness of nudges, particularly those rooted in descriptive and injunctive social norms, in the management of common pool resources within the framework of differential games. Using a series of economic experiments, we examine how these nudges influence individual and group behaviors in dynamic settings. Contrary to expectations, our results reveal that nudges, in this context, do not significantly impact the strategic decision-making processes in managing shared resources. This finding challenges the prevailing assumption about the universal applicability of nudges and suggests a need for a more nuanced understanding of their role in diverse economic scenarios.

Keywords: Dynamic Optimization; Experimental Economics; Renewable Resources; Nudges (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-02-26
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04477427v2
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04477427v2/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-04477427

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Laurent Garnier ().