Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution

Erzo Luttmer

No 9902, Working Papers from Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago

Abstract: Interpersonal preferences - preferences that depend on the characteristics of others - are typically hard to infer from observable individual behavior. As an alternative approach, this paper uses survey data to investigate interpersonal preferences. The General Social Survey contains self-reported preferences for welfare spending, which I validate with voting behavior on cuts in welfare benefits. Using this preference measure, I show that preferences for income redistribution are not only determined by financial self-interest but also by interpersonal preferences. These interpersonal preferences are characterized by a negative exposure effect - individuals decrease their support for welfare if there are more welfare recipients in their area - and racial group loyalty - individuals increase their support for welfare spending if a larger fraction of welfare recipients in their area belongs to their racial group. My results hold when areas are defined as states, metropolitan areas or census tracts and are robust.

Keywords: interdependent preferences; altruism; income redistribution; race; welfare; AFDC (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution (2001)
Working Paper: Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:har:wpaper:9902

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