Independence, Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Robin Mason () and Akos Valentinyi ()
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Robin Mason: University of Southampton
Akos Valentinyi: University of Southampton

No 303, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to recent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a player’s signal is sufficiently uninformative of the signals of its opponents (in the sense of the Fisher information of the signal), then the player’s best response to any strategy profile of its opponents is non-decreasing in its signal. Secondly, a contraction mapping argument shows that sufficient heterogeneity ensures that equilibrium is unique.

Keywords: Co-ordination; Interaction games; Heterogeneity; Unique equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-05
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:0303

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