We Can't Argue Forever

Kata Bognar () and Lones Smith
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Kata Bognar: Economics Department University of Michigan

No 415, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: We analyze time-costly decision-making in committees by privately informed individuals, such as juries, panels, boards, etc. In the spirit of the Coase Conjecture, we show that the decision is "almost instantaneous" when individuals entertain identical objectives. Delay can only be understood as the outcome of conflicting (biased) objectives.

Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2004-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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