Traffic Routing Oligopoly

Dávid Csercsik and Balázs Sziklai

No 1309, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested networks. Traffic routing has been extensively analyzed from the non-cooperative aspect. A common assumption is that each individual optimizes his route in the network selfishly. However looking at the same network from a different scope in some cases we can find some actors that are responsible for the majority part of the traffic. From the point of view of these actors cooperation is indeed an inherent possibility of the game. Sharing information and cooperation with other agents may result in cost savings, and more efficient utilization of network capacities. Depending on the goal and employed strategy of the agents many possible cooperative games can arise. Our aim is to introduce and analyze these wide variety of transferable utility (TU) games. Since the formation of a coalition may affect other players costs via the implied flow and the resulting edge load changes in the network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in partition function form.

Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Partition function form games; Routing; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 L13 L91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1309.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to econ.core.hu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Journal Article: Traffic routing oligopoly (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1309

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nora Horvath ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).