How to choose a non-manipulable delegation?
Burak Can (),
Péter Csóka () and
Emre Ergin ()
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Emre Ergin: PhD, Maastricht University, School of Business and Economics
No 1713, IEHAS Discussion Papers from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
This paper analyzes how to choose a delegation, a committee to represent a society such as in a peace conference. We propose normative conditions and seek optimal, consistent, neutral, and non-manipulable ways to choose a delegation. We show that a class of threshold rules are characterized by these criteria. The rules do not choose a fixed number of delegates, but instead require different sizes of delegations, depending on the heterogeneity in society. Therefore the resulting delegations are very inclusive, and with t delegates the ratio of individuals whose opinions are not included is always below (0:5)t, following the well-known Zeno's dichotomy. For instance a delegation of size 2 should have at least 75% support from the society and therefore only less than 25% of the opinion pool can be neglected.
Keywords: Aggregation Rules; Committee Selection; Conflict Management; Kemeny Distance; Strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:has:discpr:1713
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