Stable project allocation under distributional constraints

Kolos Agoston, Péter Biró and Richard Szanto ()
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Richard Szanto: Department of Decision Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest

No 1733, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: In a two-sided matching market when agents on both sides have preferences the stability of the solution is typically the most important requirement. However, we may also face some distributional constraints with regard to the minimum number of assignees or the distribution of the assignees according to their types. These two kind of requirements can be challenging to reconcile in practice. In this paper we describe two real applications, a project allocation problem and a workshop assignment problem, both involving some distributional constraints. We used integer programming techniques to find reasonably good solutions with regard to the stability and the distributional constraints. Our approach can be useful in a variety of different applications, such as resident allocation with lower quotas, controlled school choice or college admissions with addirmative action.

Keywords: stable matching; two-sided markets; project allocation; linear programming; multi-criteria decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2017-11
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Journal Article: Stable project allocation under distributional constraints (2018)
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