Multidimensional global games and some applications

Dzsamila Vonnák ()

No 1803, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: I extend the standard global games framework by introducing an addition target on which agents can coordinate on. I compare this multidimensional case to the standard global games problem. Furthermore, I investigate the effects of consolidating the multiple targets. I find that introducing an additional option generates a negative strategic correlation between the options and thus weakens the coordination. However, unifying the options eliminates the endogenous correlation and thus restores the coordination. I also show two potential applications to be modeled by these kinds of games.

Keywords: global games; coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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