Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size

Agnes Cseh (), Tamas Fleiner () and Petra Harjan ()
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Agnes Cseh: Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics
Tamas Fleiner: Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Institute of Economics and Department of Computer Science and Information Theory, Budapest University of Technology and Economics
Petra Harjan: Department of Computer Science and Information Theory, Budapest University of Technology and Economics

No 2005, CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS from Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies

Abstract: We tackle the problem of partitioning players into groups of fixed size, such as allocating eligible students to shared dormitory rooms. Each student submits preferences over the other individual students. We study several settings, which differ in the size of the rooms to be filled, the orderedness or completeness of the preferences, and the way of calculating the value of a coalition---based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of deciding the existence, and then finding a Pareto optimal assignment, and the complexity of verifying Pareto optimality for a given assignment.

Keywords: Pareto-optimality; coalition; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-gth
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