Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching Markets and Similarity of Preferences

Hanna Halaburda

No 09-068, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: This paper investigates the causes and welfare consequences of unravelling in two-sided matching markets. It shows that similarity of preferences is an important factor driving unravelling. In particular, it shows that under the ex-post stable mechanism (the mechanism that the literature focuses on), unravelling is more likely to occur when participants have more similar preferences. It also shows that any Pareto-optimal mechanism must prevent unravelling, and that the ex-post stable mechanism is Pareto-optimal if and only if it prevents unravelling.

Keywords: two-sided matching; unravelling; similarity of preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/09-068.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:09-068

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by HBS ().