A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems

Itai Ashlagi (iashlagi@hbs.edu), Emin Karagözoğlu and Bettina Klaus (bettina.klaus@unil.ch)
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Itai Ashlagi: Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

No 09-069, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems. We show that in a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.

Keywords: Bankruptcy/estate division problems; claims monotonicity; direct revelation claim game; equal division; equal treatment of equals; Nash equilibria; nonbossiness; (weak) order preservation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems (2012)
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