Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

No 09-111, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We consider one-to-one, one-sided matching (roommate) problems in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. We introduce a so-called bi-choice graph for each pair of stable matchings and characterize its structure. Exploiting this structure we obtain as a corollary the "lone wolf" theorem and a decomposability result. The latter result together with transitivity of blocking leads to an elementary proof of the so-called stable median matching theorem, showing how the often incompatible concepts of stability (represented by the political economist Adam Smith) and fairness (represented by the political philosopher John Rawls) can be reconciled for roommate problems. Finally, we extend our results to two-sided matching problems.

Keywords: fairness; matching; median; stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (2010)
Working Paper: Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians (2008)
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