Financing Risk and Innovation
Ramana Nanda () and
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf ()
No 11-013, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School
We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to financing risk ? a forecast of limited future funding ? by modifying their focus to finance less innovative firms. Potential shocks to the supply of capital create the need for increased upfront financing, but this protection lowers the real option value of the new venture. In equilibrium, financing risk disproportionately impacts innovative ventures with the greatest real option value. We propose that extremely novel technologies may need `hot' financial markets to get through the initial period of discovery or diffusion.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-ent, nep-ino, nep-ppm and nep-upt
Date: 2010-08, Revised 2014-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (19) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:11-013
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Soebagio Notosoehardjo ().