Misconduct in Financial Services: Differences across Organizations

Jennifer Brown and Dylan Minor ()
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Dylan Minor: Harvard Business School, Strategy Unit

No 16-022, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: We examine misconduct in financial services. We propose a theory in which experts extract surplus based on the value of their firm's brand and their own skills. Using sales complaint data for insurance agents, we find that agents working exclusively for large branded firms are more likely to be the subject of justified sales complaints, relative to smaller independent experts, despite doing substantially less business. In addition, more experienced experts attract more complaints per year.

Keywords: Misconduct; expert services; asymmetric information; credence goods; insurance; ethics. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2015-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
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