Markets for Ideas: Prize Structure, Entry Limits, and the Design of Ideation Contests

Pavel Kireyev ()
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Pavel Kireyev: Harvard Business School

No 16-129, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: Contests are a popular mechanism for the procurement of innovation. In marketing, design, and other creative industries, firms use freelance marketplaces to organize contests and obtain high-quality ideas for ads, new products, and even business strategies from participants. A central question faced by contest sponsors is how to appropriately structure prizes and entry regulations. I develop an empirical model of idea generation (ideation) contests and investigate the impact of the number of prizes, prize amount, and submission limit on participation and quality outcomes using data from a popular marketing ideation platform. The model explains participant submission decisions, jury ratings, and sponsor rankings of winning submissions. Counterfactuals reveal the impact of design parameters on outcomes and provide guidance for the optimal design of ideation contests and platforms.

Keywords: idea generation; crowdsourcing; contest design; structural estimation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-mic
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