Designing Online Marketplaces: Trust and Reputation Mechanisms

Michael Luca ()
Additional contact information
Michael Luca: Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit

No 17-017, Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School

Abstract: Online marketplaces have proliferated over the past decade, creating new markets where none existed. By reducing transaction costs, online marketplaces facilitate transactions that otherwise would not have occurred and enable easier entry of small sellers. One central challenge faced by designers of online marketplaces is how to build enough trust to facilitate transactions between strangers. This paper provides an economist's toolkit for designing online marketplaces, focusing on trust and reputation mechanisms.

Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=17-017.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=17-017.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/pages/download.aspx?name=17-017.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hbs:wpaper:17-017

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Harvard Business School Working Papers from Harvard Business School Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by HBS ().