Hidden Subsidies and the Public Ownership of Sports Facilities: The Case of Levi's Stadium in Santa Clara

Robert Baumann (), Victor Matheson and Debra O'Connor ()
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Debra O'Connor: Department of Economics and Accounting, College of the Holy Cross

No 1705, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: Levi's Stadium in Santa Clara, California is an example of a private financing / public ownership arrangement. While the stadium�s construction resulted in no direct tax increases, this ownership arrangement allows the San Francisco 49ers to avoid many types of taxes on the income generated from Levi�s Stadium. We estimate the total tax savings to the 49ers at between $106 and $213 million over the first 20 years of Levi�s Stadium compared with a privately financed and owned option. We argue that tax savings inherent in private financing / public ownership arrangements represent indirect and hidden subsidies.

Keywords: football; sports; stadium; tax subsidies; accounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H83 L83 Z23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2017-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in International Journal of Sports Management and Marketing, forthcoming

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