A Predator-Prey Model of Appropriation, Production, and Exchange

Charles Anderton, Roxane Anderton () and John Carter ()
Additional contact information
Roxane Anderton: Department of Economics, Clark University
John Carter: Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross

No 9602, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: Appropriation possibilities significantly alter economic fundamentals in a production and exchange economy. This is the primary lesson of our model, which combines Ricardian trade and the potential for predator/prey behavior. The model shows how conflict can be subdued by mutual gains from trade, but at a resource cost that modifies the exchange itself. On the other hand, it identifies conditions wherein appropriation incentives are so strong that specialized production and trade are precluded altogether. The model also reveals a new way to think about and measure the gains from trade.

Keywords: appropriation; property rights; Predator-Prey game; conflict; exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 1996-12
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Published in "Economic Activity in the Shadow of Conflict," Economic Inquiry, Vol. 37:1, January 1999, pp. 166-179.

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