An Experimental Test of a Predator-Prey Model of Conflict

Charles Anderton and John Carter ()
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John Carter: Department of Economics, College of the Holy Cross

No 9603, Working Papers from College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics

Abstract: Grossman and Kim's (1996) predator-prey model predicts as the effectiveness of offense against defense increases, the equilibrium level of appropriation will vary from zero to full to partial predation. We test the prediction using a repeated single-play protocol with eight decision periods. The data show a clear and substantial convergence to subgame perfect outcomes, with most movement occurring in the first several periods. The results suggest that standard game-theoretic principles may be particularly appropriate to the study of conflict.

Keywords: appropriation; property rights; Predator-Prey game; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1996-12
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Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 45:1, May 2001, pp. 83-97.

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Journal Article: An experimental test of a predator-prey model of appropriation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hcx:wpaper:9603

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