Health insurance and health care utilization: Theory and evidence from Australia 1989-90, CHERE Discussion Paper No 44

Elizabeth Savage ()

Discussion Papers from CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney

Abstract: The Australian hospital system is characterised by the co-existence of private hospitals, where individuals pay for services and public hospitals, where services are free to all but delivered after a waiting time. The decision to purchase insurance for private hospital treatment depends on the trade-off between price of treatment, waiting time and the insurance premium. Clearly the potential for adverse selection and moral hazard exists. When the endogeneity of the insurance decision is accounted for, the extent of moral hazard can be substantial increasing the expected length of a hospital stay by a factor of up to three.

Keywords: health insurance; hospitals; moral hazard; Australia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06
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