The Ultimatum Game Revisited

Jan Tullberg
Additional contact information
Jan Tullberg: Dept. of Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics, Postal: P.O. Box 6501, S-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden

No 1999:2, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration from Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: The starting point of this article is the result of one ultimatum game experiment - one of many showing a huge deviation from the predictions of micro theory. However, further analysis gives an explanation of subject behavior that deserves to be seen as rational, if assumptions, such as a total secrecy resulting in no effects on reputation, are questioned. Responders' actual behavior can be understood as adjusted to generally realistic reputation effects, and the choices of the Proposers are surprisingly attuned to actual Responder demands. If seen in this light, the subjects seem to understand the situation and behave accordingly.

Keywords: Ultimatum; buffer; reputation; spite; altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1999-04-29, Revised 2002-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://swoba.hhs.se/hastba/papers/hastba1999_002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhb:hastba:1999_002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Business Administration from Stockholm School of Economics The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, SE 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Helena Lundin ().