Preferences for Short-Term Versus Long-Term Bonuses for Stock Investments

Martin Hedesström, Maria Andersson (), Tommy Gärling and Anders Biel
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Martin Hedesström: Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg
Maria Andersson: Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg
Tommy Gärling: Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg
Anders Biel: Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg

No 2010/11, Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers from Sustainable Investment Research Platform

Abstract: Performance-related bonuses in the finance sector are considered important tools to provide incentives. An example is that stock portfolio managers are awarded bonuses conditionally on their portfolios producing superior returns either relative to an index or equivalent funds. Concerns are however expressed that bonuses to portfolio managers are based on too short time intervals, which may impact negatively on the degree to which environmental and social factors are taken into account in investment decisions. The question addressed in this article is how bonus schemes can be designed so that delayed payouts will be equally motivating as short-term payouts. We have conducted two experiments to investigate preference for bonus payments that are paid out either frequently of infrequently. In Experiment 1 employing 27 undergraduates, preferences were measured for one certain long-term bonus versus four certain bonuses evenly distributed across time. A majority chose the short-term bonuses, and in order for a long-term bonus to be equally preferred the results showed that it needs to be approximately 40 percent higher than the four combined short-term bonuses. Experiment 2 employing another 36 undergraduates introduced uncertainty of outcomes which more accurately reflects the setting faced by stock investors. A four-year bonus is compared to four one-year bonuses. Uncertainty was the same, decreasing or increasing over the four years. The results showed that decreasing uncertainty made a majority prefer the four-year bonus to the added one-year bonuses. In conclusion, introducing uncertainty in choices concerning future outcomes is shown to reduce the extent to which future bonus outcomes are discounted relative to immediate bonus outcomes.

Keywords: Portfolio management; Performance-related bonus; Time discounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2010-06-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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