Intrinsic Motivation versus Signaling in Open Source Software Development
Jürgen Bitzer (),
Wolfram Schrettl and
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Wolfram Schrettl: Free University Berlin
No 06-7, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics
This papers sheds light on the puzzling fact that even though open source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free by highly qualified, young, motivated individuals, and evolves at a rapid pace. We show that when OSS development is understood as the private provision of a public good, these features emerge quite naturally. We adapt a dynamic private-provision-of-public-goods model to reflect key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. Apart from extrinsic motives (namely signaling), the present model also contains intrinsic motives of OSS programmers, such as play value or homo ludens payoff, userprogrammers’ and gift culture benefits. Such intrinsic motives feature extensively in the wider OSS literature and contribute new insights to the economic analysis
Keywords: open source software; public goods; homo ludens; war of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 L31 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-ino and nep-pbe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2006_007
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