The Political Economy of Carbon Securities and Environmental Policy
Sarah Polborn ()
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Sarah Polborn: Department of Economics, Aarhus School of Business, Postal: FRICHSHUSET , Hermodsvej 22, 1st and 2nd floors , DK 8230 Aabyhoej, Denmark, http://www.asb.dk/omos/institutter/departmentofeconomics/facultyandstaff/academicstaff/sarahpolborn/
No 10-19, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics
The costs of the current suboptimal carbon abatement policy are likely in the range of 3 to 6 trillion 2005 US dollars. Using methods from the political economy of environmental policy, the paper develops a new carbon abatement policy instrument, carbon securities. A carbon security entitles its owner to a fixed proportion of ex ante unknown total emissions. This creates an additional group of stakeholders on the side of the issue that has traditionally been underrepresented. The advantages over existing systems include an equilibrium carbon price closer to the social optimum, a more predictable environmental policy, and higher investment in abatement technology
Keywords: Carbon abatement; environmental policy; global warming; interest groups; lobbying; policy instrument design; political process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ene, nep-env, nep-pol and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2010_019
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