Migration Regulation Contagion

Herbert Brücker () and Philipp Schröder

No 10-22, Working Papers from University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines the political economy of a selective immigration policy in a model with incomplete information on the characteristics of migrants. We address two questions: First, how does a selective immigration policy affect the number of immigrants which is admitted by the receiving country, and second, how does a selective immigration policy in one country affect immigration policies in other countries. We find (i) that countries with selective immigration policies ceteris paribus tend to admit more migrants than countries without such policies, and (ii) that neighboring countries will follow each other in implementing selective immigration policies. These theoretical findings are supported by evidence from an econometric panel analysis of immigration policies in 15 OECD countries in the period from 1980 to 2005.

Keywords: International migration; political economy of migration; skill-selective immigration policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Migration regulation contagion (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:aareco:2010_022

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