Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core

Sjur Flåm and L. Koutsougeras ()
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L. Koutsougeras: School of Economics, University of Manchester,, Postal: Oxford Road M13 9PL UK.

No 04/07, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the other for knowledge. Focus is on specific, computable solutions that are generated by such prices and belong to the private core. Solutions of that sort obtain under standard regularity assumptions.

Keywords: exchange economy; cooperative game; transferable utility; differential information; private core; Lagrangian duality; value of information. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2007-02-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Private information, transferable utility, and the core (2010)
Working Paper: Private information, transferable utility,and the core (2007)
Working Paper: Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core (2005)
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