Exposing agricultural cooperatives to competition

Kristin Linnerud () and Steinar Vagstad
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Kristin Linnerud: CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, Oslo, Postal: P.O. Box 1129, Blindern, N-0318 Oslo, Norway

No 06/08, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the optimal regulation of agricultural markets when farmers have organized their activity in a cooperative which is the monopoly supplier of an upstream product and which competes with a single rival firm in selling a homogenous downstream product. The rival's marginal cost is private information and therefore the rival expects to earn an information rent. We show that the optimal access price discriminates against the private rival because rent is more valuable in the cooperative than in the private firm, and the regulator therefore sacrifices some cost efficiency in order to shift rents. Thus, while competition will benefit farmers, consumers and tax payers, the extent of competition should optimally be somewhat limited.

Keywords: Agricultural markets; cooperatives; regulation; access pricing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 L23 L33 L43 L51 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2008-06-10
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