Exclusivity and Bidding for Premium Broadcasting Rights

Eirik N. Christensen and Bjørn Olav Johansen ()
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Eirik N. Christensen: University of Bergen, Department of Economics, Postal: Hermann Fossgt. 6, N-5007 Bergen, Norway

No 08/08, Working Papers in Economics from University of Bergen, Department of Economics

Abstract: Often, we observe that some TV channels are distributed on several platforms, and by several distributors on the same platform, while others are distributed exclusively by one distributor. In this paper, we analyse a TV channelel's incentives for choosing exclusive distribution versus full distribution. We then proceed by studying if bidding for premium content (e.g., broadcasting rights to football) influences the incentives for choosing exclusive distribution. We show that absent of premium content, the channel has incentives to choose exclusive distribution, but the existence of premium con- tent dramatically reduces these incentives, and full distribution is the likely outcome.

Keywords: Exclusive dealing; auctions; football; media. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 L13 L42 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2008-08-04
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