On Specific Performance in Civil Law and Enforcement Costs

Henrik Lando and Caspar Rose
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Caspar Rose: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

No 2000-10, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance

Abstract: Abstract: We argue that enforcement costs, ignored in the literature

on ‘efficient breach’, are important for the choice of contract breach

remedy. Empirically we find that specific performance is almost never

claimed in Civil Law countries. It involves forcing a party in breach to

perform actions while damages involves extracting only a monetary

payment. The former is more difficult and more coercive. We study

enforcement rules of Denmark, France and Germany. Enforcement of

specific performance is absent in Denmark and weak in France. In

Germany it seems stricter, which points to the importance of costs of

enforcement to the claimant.

Keywords: Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2001-05-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2000_010

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