RULES THAT MATTER: LIMITS TO COMPETITION POLICY HARMONISATION IN EU ENLARGEMENT

Peter Møllegaard and Jochen Lorentzen
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Peter Møllegaard: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Jochen Lorentzen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

No 05-2000, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy

harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we

compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in

Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate

countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the

candidates. Finally, we use insights from case studies of subcontractor agreements in

the Eastern Europe. to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European

competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law

enforcement. Our conclusion targets an underdeveloped competition culture as

primary culprit for limits to effective – as opposed to merely legal – harmonisation of

competition policy in the run-up to EU enlargement.

Keywords: competition policy; EU; Eastern Europe (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A00 F00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2001-05-17
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