AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION IN CORPORATIONS WITH CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP

Morten Bennedsen and Daniel Wolfenzon
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Morten Bennedsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Daniel Wolfenzon: Michigan Business School, Postal: Chicago Business School

No 15-2000, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a theoretical analysis of the relationship between investor protection and the performance of corporations with concentrated ownership and apply it to analyze two types of investor protection. First, we analyze the cost and benefits of imposing super-majority requirements on certain important policy issues in the corporation. Second, we analyze why it can be in the interest of the corporation to impose restrictions on the free transferability of shares.

Keywords: Investor protection; Concentrated ownership; Corporate performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000-12-01
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