Lobbying and Legislative Organization The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure

Morten Bennedsen and Sven Feldmann
Additional contact information
Morten Bennedsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

No 01-2002, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze how the structure of organizational form of legislative institutions affects

interest groups ’incentives to lobby.Lobbying is modelled the strategic provision

of information by an interest group to a multi-person legislature.We show that

the effectiveness of lobbying lies in changing the viable policy coalitions.We show

in a multi-period policy framework that a distinguishing feature between the US

Congress and European parliamentary systems —the vote of confidence procedure —

can significantly change the incentives for interest group lobbying.

Keywords: Organizational form; legislative institutions; Lobbying; Parliamentary systems; Politics; Interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 E10 E60 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2002-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7616 (application/pdf)
Full text not avaiable

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure (2002)
Journal Article: Lobbying and Legislative Organization: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_001

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16 A. 1.floor, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CBS Library Research Registration Team ().