Must Trust Bust?

Peter Møllgaard

No 02-2002, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: Our trust in competition policy is based on faith in markets.

When markets are oligopolies, already classical economists’ trust in

competition busted: Oligopolies carry the seeds of collusion. To develop,

collusion needs trust between firms. But new leniency programmes are

designed to bust that trust. I discuss when trust busters are likely to succeed

and when trust prevails.

Keywords: Competition policy; Oligopolies; Collusion; Trust; Leniency programmes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G10 G18 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2002-02-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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