Competition compliance: limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement

Jochen Lorentzen and Peter Møllgaard
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Jochen Lorentzen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

No 11-2002, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy

harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we

compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in

Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate

countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the

candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern

Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight

instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice

and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion

recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, postenlargement.

Keywords: Competition policy; vertical restraints; vertical agreements; Eastern Europe; EU harmonisation; subcontracting; competition law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 G18 K00 K12 L14 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2002-09-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-law
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Working Paper: Competition Compliance: Limits to Competition Policy Harmonisation in EU Enlargement (2002)
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