Equilibrium Arrivals to a Last-come First-served Preemptive-resume Queue

Jesper Breinbjerg, Trine Platz and Lars Peter Østerdal
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Jesper Breinbjerg: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Postal: Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M.

No 17-2020, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics

Abstract: We consider a queueing system where a single server opens and serves users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). A finite number of strategic users must choose individually when to arrive at the server. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. Based on the constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium, we provide a numerical example in which we compute the symmetric equilibrium strategy and compare the resulting social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.

Keywords: Queueing; Strategic arrivals; Nash equilibrium; LCFS-PR; FCFS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2020-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue (2024)
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