One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence

Johan Eklund (johan.eklund@ju.se) and Thomas Poulsen
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Thomas Poulsen: Copenhagen Business School

No 238, Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation from Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies

Abstract: Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

Keywords: Ownership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-10-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cfn and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0238

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