Understanding non-compliance with rights-based fisheries management in Vietnam

Bui Bich Xuan (), Quach Thi Khanh Ngoc (), Claire W. Armstrong (), Kofi Vondolia () and Pham Khanh Nam ()
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Bui Bich Xuan: Nha Trang University, 02 Nguyen Dinh Chieu, Nha Trang, Vietnam
Quach Thi Khanh Ngoc: Nha Trang University, 02 Nguyen Dinh Chieu, Nha Trang, Vietnam
Claire W. Armstrong: UiT The Arctic University of Norway, 9037 Tromsø, Norway.
Kofi Vondolia: Department of Applied Economics, School of Economics, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana and Centre for Coastal Management - Africa Centre of Excellence in Coastal Resilience, University of Cape Coast, Cape Coast, Ghana
Pham Khanh Nam: University of Economics Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

No 25-2, EfD Discussion Paper from Environment for Development, University of Gothenburg

Abstract: Understanding fishers’ non-compliance behavior is essential for effective management and conservation of small-scale fisheries. Our study took place in Tam Giang Lagoon, central Vietnam, where Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) have been established since 2009. To estimate the proportion of artisanal fishers engaging in illegal fishing, we used a randomized response technique alongside direct questioning to investigate this type of sensitive behavior. We also employed a binary logistic regression model to analyze the factors influencing non-compliance. A combination of RRT and other methods such as direct questioning and regression model gives a more comprehensive understanding of the drivers behind illegal fishing behavior, allowing for tailored interventions that address specific issues within fisheries. Our findings show that awareness of the negative impacts of illegal fishing and the perceived legitimacy of regulations significantly affect compliance, while instrumental incentives and norms do not have statistically significant impacts. Additionally, certain fishers’ characteristics are determinants of noncompliance, such as younger fishers and more experienced fishers are more likely to violate regulations, while those with higher education show better compliance. We also discuss policies to enhance compliance within TURFs. This study enriches the literature on fishing regulation compliance and provides valuable insights for policy design and implementation aimed at improving adherence to regulations.

Keywords: Non-compliance; fishing regulations; randomized response technique; TURF; Vietnam. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2025-05-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-env and nep-sea
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