Nord Pool: A Power Market Without Market Power

Erik Hjalmarsson

No 28, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Regulatory reform in the Nordic electricity-supply markets has resulted in a single integrated Nordic electricity market. This paper performs an econometric study of market power in the spot market of Nord Pool, the joint Nordic power exchange. I use a dynamic extension of the Bresnahan-Lau model, and weekly data for the period from 1996 through April 1999. To my knowledge, this is the first study of power markets that is not able to reject the hypothesis of perfect competition. The most likely reason for this absence of market power is the low ownership concentration in generation in the integrated Nordic electricity market.

Keywords: electricity markets; deregulation; market power; spot market; power exchange; electricity pool; cointegration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 C51 D41 D43 L13 L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2000-08-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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