Congo: The Prize of Predation
Ola Olsson () and
Heather Congdon Fors ()
No 97, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
The article analyzes the war against Mobutu (1996-97) and the more recent war (1998-) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with particular attention to greed and grievance as motivating factors in these two wars. Whereas our usage of the term ‘greed’ simply reflects the desire to gain control of natural resource rents, we model ‘grievance’ as deliberate institutional differences, implemented by the ruler, between the formal and informal sectors. On the basis of quantitative and qualitative evidence, we outline a model of a predatory conflict between a kleptocratic ruler and a group of potential predators within a given region. The potential predators choose between peaceful production and predation on the ruling elite, who control the country’s natural resource rents. It is shown that institutional grievance between the formal and informal sectors, along with the relative strength of the ruler's defense, play a key role for the initiation of a war. This observation is used to explain the timing of the two wars analyzed in this article. The model also shows that once a war has commenced, the abundance of natural resources and the ruler’s kleptocratic tendencies determine conflict intensity. This result is also well in line with experience from the most recent Congolese war.
Keywords: Congo; appropriative conflict; natural resources; greed; grievance; predation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 N47 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05-16, Revised 2003-10-30
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Published in Journal of Peace Research, 2004, pages 321-336.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0097
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