Deciding Who's Decisive: Municipality Break-Ups and the Behavior of Local Politicians

Anna Brink
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Anna Brink : Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG

No 104, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Swedish municipality parts aiming for secession are highly dependent on the municipal council's acceptance in order to succeed. Only four of the 25 municipality break-up verdicts passed by the central government have not been in line with the municipal council's recommendation. In nearly all cases, the recommendation seems to be based on the stated opinion in local referenda or opinion polls. However, by deciding on whether the whole municipality, or the seceding part alone should be encompassed by the referendum or opinion poll, the municipal council can affect the probability of obtaining the desired result. This paper empirically studies this decision. Two factors show to be important. If secession would result in a large reduction of the municipality's population and a decrease in its per capita tax base, the referendum or opinion poll is more likely to encompass the whole municipality. Such a referendum or opinion poll does, in turn, decrease the probability of a municipal council supporting the case, which reduces the central government's propensity to finally approve secession.

Keywords: municipality break-ups; secession; referenda; municipal council (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2003-09-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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