Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism

Olof Johansson-Stenman ()

No 139, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism.

Keywords: Global environmental problems; externalities; altruism; transboundary pollution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D63 D64 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2004-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg and nep-res
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http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2776 (text/html)

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Journal Article: Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism (2005)
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