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Does Benefit Transfer Always Work: a Multi-country Comparison

Hala Abou-Ali and Mohammed Belhaj ()
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Mohammed Belhaj: IVL, Postal: Swedish Environmental Research Institute

No 158, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a 50 percent reduction in air pollution caused by road traffic in both Cairo (Egypt) and Rabat-Salé (Morocco) using a contingent valuation method with identical elicitation questions. Despite the fact that both the numbers of inhabitants and vehicles are higher in Cairo the willingness to pay to reduce the impacts of vehicle emissions is higher in Rabat-Salé although incomes are rather similar in both cities. This paper shows that the relatively often-used benefit transfer frequently leads to biases where damage costs are under- or overestimated.

Keywords: Air pollution; Benefit transfer; Contingent valuation; Willingness to pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2005-01-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa
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