Cost Benefit Rules when Nature Counts

Olof Johansson-Stenman ()

No 198, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyses normative implications of relaxing the conventional welfare economics assumptions anthropocentrism and welfarism, i.e. that only human well-being counts intrinsically, combined with various types of non-selfish individual preferences. Social decision rules are derived for the optimum provision of a public good (environmental quality). It is shown that in several cases analysed, the basic Samuelson rule still holds, in terms of aggregate marginal willingness to pay.

Keywords: Altruism; welfarism; anthropocentrism; cost-benefit analysis; public good provision; social preferences; conditional cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D70 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-03-03, Revised 2006-05-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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