Natural Resource Dependency and Quality of Government
Mette Anthonsen,
Åsa Löfgren and
Klas Nilsson
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Mette Anthonsen: The Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
Klas Nilsson: Department of Political Science University of Gothenburg, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG
No 415, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper introduces quality of government rather than regime type as dependent variable in studies of the political effects of natural resources. It consists of two parts. First, it theorizes the role of fiscal dependency of oil and gas rents in relation to three different dimensions of quality of government; low corruption, bureaucratic quality and legal impartiality. Second, it finds significant, negative effects of oil and gas rent dependency on all three dimensions of quality in a sample of 139 states in the period 1984 to 2006. The results hold for inclusion of control variables such as regime type, income, region and religion.
Keywords: Oil; gas; corruption; bureaucracy; legal impartiality; large-N (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N50 O13 O43 P48 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2009-12-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0415
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