Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms

Amrish Patel and Edward Cartwright

No 488, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.

Keywords: Signalling; Conformity; Social Norms; Naïve Beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2011-02-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-soc
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Journal Article: Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms (2012)
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