EU Enlargement, Parallel Trade and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals. What's blame? Derogation or perception?

David Granlund () and Miyase Yesim Köksal ()
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David Granlund: The Swedish Retail Institute and Umeå University, Postal: The Swedish Retail Institute, SE 103 29 Stockholm, and, Dept of Economics, Umeå University, SE 901 87 Umeå
Miyase Yesim Köksal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Postal: Box 640, SE 40530 GÖTEBORG

No 499, Working Papers in Economics from University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics

Abstract: Given the cost of trade and availability of pharmaceuticals, the driving force for parallel trade is the price difference between the source (exporting) and the destination (importing) country. An increase in the price difference or in the availability of pharmaceuticals for parallel trade should increase price competition in the destination country. Using 2003-2007 data from Sweden we investigated whether EU enlargement in 2004, when new countries with low pharmaceutical prices joined the EU, increased competition from parallel imports. Drugs facing competition from parallel imports are found to have on average 17% to 21% lower prices than they would have had if they had never faced such competition. But, contrary to expectation, EU enlargement is not found to have increased this effect, which might be explained by derogations and changes in consumer perceptions of parallel imports.

Keywords: EU enlargement; parallel trade; pharmaceuticals; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 L51 L65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2011-05-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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